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The Anti-Chain Store Movement and the Politics of Consumption 
 
In the summer of 1933, Charles H. Lyon, a Kansas City businessman, took “an extended 
tour by motor” of the Central Plains. The following March, having had time to reflect on 
his trip, he wrote to President Franklin D. Roosevelt to describe what he had seen, and 
to propose a remedy for the economic crisis gripping the nation. “Every good town had 
the same stores,” he explained. “The downtown of one city was a replica of the next 
one, and for every chain store that reared its head, three individually owned stores laid 
down and died.” Like thousands of other critics of the chains, Lyon believed that the 
growing homogeneity of small town life was brought about by the predatory nature and 
destructive impact of the chain store: “Chain stores pay very little toward the upkeep of 
a town,” he wrote, “[t]hey gradually kill it.” As well as reducing the aesthetic appeal of 
America’s Main Streets, chain stores imperilled the livelihoods of local merchants and 
contributed to the erosion of the national character. “Individual stores,” he informed 
the president, “are the backbone of a Nation.” The remedy was simple: Roosevelt 
should support moves to “tax the chain stores high enough so individual stores can 
compete against them.”1 
 
By 1933, the first year of the New Deal, the idea that punitive taxation was required to 
protect local communities from the pernicious influence of the chains was far from 
being novel. In fact, chain store taxes were the most concrete achievement of the great 
wave of anti-chain store protest that swept through the United States in the 1920s and 
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1930s. In 1923, the Missouri state legislature became the first to consider a chain store 
tax bill. In 1927, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, and Pennsylvania became the first 
states to pass such a law. But it was in the 1930s, in the depths of the Great Depression, 
that anti-chain legislative activity reached its zenith. Between 1931 and 1937 twenty-six 
states passed anti-chain laws. Many municipalities followed suit, devising an array of 
ingenious formulas to tax stores with multiple units. In 1938, Texas congressman Wright 
Patman failed in his attempt to impose a national chain store tax of the sort Lyon called 
for, but by then Congress had already passed two new laws – the Robinson-Patman Act 
and the Miller-Tydings Act – designed to adjust the antitrust regime in favor of small 
retailers.2 
 
While these various legislative initiatives have received some limited scholarly attention, 
the wider movement from which they sprang – the anti-chain store movement – 
remains one of the more neglected American social movements of first half of the 
twentieth century. This article examines that movement, and the reasons for its relative 
neglect, in the context of the recent surge of historical interest in the politics of 
consumption.3 
 
It is true that since the 1990s, when campaigns against “big-box” stores such as Wal-
Mart made anti-chain store politics once more a familiar feature of American life, there 
has been a minor revival of scholarly interest in the anti-chain store movement. This 
revival has been led by political philosophers, political sociologists, and legal scholars. In 
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his influential book, Democracy’s Discontent, Michael Sandel presented the “local 
grocers and druggists” who opposed the chains as “the last bearers of republican 
virtue”, holding them up as models for the renewal of civic republicanism. Less 
romantically, Paul Ingram and Hayagreeva Rao challenged the notion that efforts to 
thwart the chains were an unmitigated failure, arguing that pro- and anti-chain factions 
were interdependent, and that the anti-chain store movement succeeded in 
substantially changing the environment in which the chains operated. “An A&P that is 
unionized, and that sacrifices some of the benefits of market power to protect its 
agricultural suppliers,” they noted, “is a changed organization.” Most recently, Richard 
Schragger suggested that the localist and decentralist arguments employed by chain 
store critics represent a lost, progressive alternative to the liberal state that emerged 
during the Second World War. As a consequence of this new work, a movement 
conventionally portrayed as a futile response to inevitable processes of social and 
economic change – Daniel Boorstin called it a “rearguard action” aimed at preserving a 
“dying past” – is beginning to emerge in a new light.4  
 
A striking feature of this ongoing reassessment, however, is that historians have played 
little part in it. Given that in the past ten to fifteen years the politics of consumption has 
emerged as an important historical sub-discipline in its own right, and that there is an 
abundance of excellent historical work on the origins and trajectory of consumer 
activism in modern American history, this is, in some respects, surprising. Nevertheless, 
when historians have attempted to explain the origins of contemporary consumer 
 4   
 
politics, or to provide a synthetic account of the relationship between the state and 
consumption in the twentieth century, they have largely neglected the anti-chain store 
movement. Instead they have focussed, for example, on consumers’ role in forging the 
American Revolution, on the conscientious consumption practiced by some abolitionists 
from the 1820s to the 1860s, or, more typically, the rise of a consumer interest during 
the Progressive and New Deal eras.5 
 
This essay challenges such accounts by arguing that the anti-chain store movement was 
a constitutive element of America’s modern politics of consumption. The movement is 
best understood, I suggest here, as a species of populist antimonopolism. It combined a 
political-economic perspective deeply indebted to the antimonopoly tradition, which 
was based on hostility toward large aggregations of economic and political power, with 
a distinctly populist character and rhetorical style. Valorizing producers (especially 
farmers) and viewing the federal government and Wall Street with deep suspicion, 
populist antimonopolism represents an important and remarkably persistent strand of 
America’s politics of reform.6 
 
In exploiting the antimonopoly tradition, the independent merchants who were at the 
forefront of anti-chain politics at the grassroots level made their case in a form typically 
associated with producer rather than with consumer politics. An argument of this essay 
however is that to separate these categories, thus implying a sharp distinction between 
inherently inter-related aspects of political economy, is not always appropriate, In fact, 
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this binary approach can be positive unhelpful. The politics of consumption – if it is to a 
plausible and effective category of historical analysis – should at the very least, I suggest 
here, be alert and open to the politics not only of production, but also of distribution 
and retail. “Production and consumption politics,” as Matthew Hilton and Martin 
Daunton put it, “are not alternatives.”7  
 
It is important to emphasise here that antimonopolism was a vibrant force in the 1920s 
and during the New Deal. This was true both of its populist variant, as expressed in the 
anti-chain politics of Southern congressmen such as Huey Long and Wright Patman, who 
attacked big banks and corporations while claiming to speak for ‘the people’; and in its 
more moderate progressive form, as articulated, for example, by Supreme Court justice 
Louis D. Brandeis, architect of Woodrow Wilson’s New Freedom, and the anti-chain 
store movement’s most prominent supporter in the judiciary.  
 
The New Deal weakened the antimonopoly tradition but it did not kill it off altogether. 
Through the 1930s, as the New Deal took on an increasingly social democratic character, 
shaped in particular by the rise of mass industrial unionism, antimonopoly was partially 
supplanted in America’s politics of reform. But the hammer blow to antimonopoly dealt 
by the New Deal was not fatal. Rather, antimonopoly politics survived, albeit in a 
somewhat attenuated form, to shape the politics, and especially the consumer politics, 
of post-war America. Indeed, as we shall see, the consumer politics of the post-war era, 
led by figures such as Estes Kefauver and Ralph Nader, owed a significant debt to 
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populist antimonopolism. While we should be careful not to neglect the differences 
between the pre- and post-New Deal politics of consumption, it is worth noting the 
continuities too, particularly as these are often overlooked. Further, while the twenty-
first century politics of consumption are in many respects radically different from those 
experienced by the independent merchants who battled chain stores in the 1920s and 
1930s, it is no surprise either that in our present era of global economic flux – the age of 
globalization –many of the debates that animated the Depression-era anti-chain store 
movement have resurfaced. 
 
Historians and the anti-chain store movement 
 
Until the 1960s, those seeking to understand the anti-chain store movement were 
forced to rely on polemical literature produced by the pro- and anti-chain factions. They 
could turn, for example to Montaville Flowers’ America Chained, a compilation of radio 
talks dramatizing the struggle between “economic force” and “human welfare”, or to 
Charles Daughters’ Wells of Discontent, which made inflammatory use of extracts from 
Wright Patman’s congressional hearings on the lobbying practices of the American 
Retail Federation. Daughters asserted that a political economy based on absentee 
ownership and concentration of control placed the United States firmly on the “broad 
highway to revolution”. Chain store boosters offered diametrically opposed arguments 
to those posited by Flowers and Daughters in works such as Godfrey Lebhar’s Chain 
Stores – Boon or Bane? Remarkably, Lebhar’s partisan 1952 study, Chain Stores in 
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America, remains to this day the fullest published narrative account of the anti-chain 
store movement.8  
 
The historical literature on the anti-chain store movement became immeasurably richer, 
however, when two great historians, Richard Hofstadter and Ellis Hawley, set down their 
thoughts on the antimonopoly tradition from which the anti-chain store movement 
sprang. Neither historian devoted sustained attention to anti-chain politics, but 
Hofstadter and Hawley between them established the intellectual parameters for 
subsequent historical understanding of the movement. In a famous essay written in 
1963, Richard Hofstadter described the antitrust movement as “one of the faded 
passions of American reform.” After 1940, he argued, antitrust, which had had a 
profound impact since 1890, ceased to be a matter of “compelling public interest,” even 
if, ironically, its actual impact on business increased. “[O]nce the United States had an 
antitrust movement without antitrust prosecutions”, he wrote; “in our time there have 
been antitrust prosecutions without an antitrust movement.” In this way, Hofstadter, 
perhaps unwittingly, steered historians away from considering the continuities between 
pre- and post-war antimonopoly politics. Why study a topic that no longer fired the 
imaginations of either reformers or the public? Hawley took a different tack from 
Hofstadter, but his subtle and brilliant study of “the problem of monopoly” had a similar 
effect. In his brief treatment of the anti-chain store movement, Hawley emphasised the 
difficulty the anti-chain forces had in forming an effective lobby in a political 
environment increasingly dominated by interest groups. He noted that while the New 
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Deal did not solve the problem of monopoly, “most Americans”, when faced with the 
“size-efficiency dilemma” would “eventually choose economic efficiency over littleness 
per se.”9  
 
Thereafter, the few historians who studied the anti-chain store movement in any depth 
operated safely within the framework established by Hofstadter and Hawley. In 1973, 
Carl Ryant, who despite the movement’s significant pockets of strength in the Midwest 
and Pacific Northwest regarded it as an essentially southern phenomenon, pointed to 
the gulf between its populist rhetoric and the “reality” of accelerating economic 
integration. Similarly, in 1982, F. John Harper portrayed the protests as remnants of a 
fading social and economic order. The “agitation”, he said, employing a term that 
implied the movement’s backwardness and irrationality, belonged “to a past which is 
not only forgotten by, but is also incomprehensible to, the vast majority of American 
independent retailers today.”10  
 
In 2008, of course, organized anti-chain store activity is comprehensible, even to 
independent retailers. Since the 1980s, small retailers in numerous communities across 
the United States have combined at the local level with small-town preservationists and 
an assortment of community activists, to form coalitions opposed to the rise of “big-
box” retail. Furthermore, in the last decade or so organized labor has joined the fray. 
Indeed, the trade union drive to challenge the employment terms, conditions, and 
practices of giant enterprises such as Wal-Mart has become the most powerful factor in 
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twenty-first century anti-chain politics. The predominence of organized labor is perhaps 
the most important respect in which present-day anti-chain activity differs from its 
Depression-era counterpart. What I would emphasise here, however, is the remarkably 
broad ideological range of contemporary critiques of the chain store. This is exemplified 
on the shelves of American bookstores, where guidebooks advising retailers and others 
on how to keep “big-box” stores out of their communities mingle with popular polemics 
seeking to exploit the widespread public unease about the power of corporate retail in 
general, and of Wal-Mart in particular. Today therefore, as in 1930, when readers of The 
Nation were told that “the chain store menace” was “the question most talked of below 
the Ohio,” the rise of retail giantism is, for some Americans at least, an issue of national 
– even international – importance. The new anti-chain store politics of the early twenty-
first century presents us with an ideal opportunity both to reconsider the import of its 
Depression-era antecedent, and to compare two distinct but related episodes of anti-
chain activism.11  
 
“Nothing but serfdom” 
 
From top to bottom, the anti-chain store movement was suffused by the language, 
imagery, and ideology of populism. When, for example, on January 24, 1931, Gerald P. 
Nye of North Dakota spoke in the United States Senate to propose that the 1914 Clayton 
Act be amended to empower the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) “to receive 
complaints and hear testimony” in relation to a host of unfair trade practices in which 
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chains were alleged to be engaged, he did so in classically populist terms. Speaking for 
“the corner grocery man, the little druggist, the struggling farmer, the owner of the 
small factory, the operator of an oil well, or the proprietor of a community packing 
plant,” Nye – a progressive Republican best known for his opposition to Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy – warned that independent operators were being “crushed” 
by a “juggernaut of greed.” Quoting from the Book of Revelation, he described 
monopoly as a pestilential force, “a cancer, spreading and devouring, as it goes, the 
whole tissue of the Nation’s economic body.” For the sake of both “the consumer” and 
“the producer” he urged that the government act to preserve “thousands of home-
owned stores, home-owned factories, home-owned banks, and independent industry.” 
If it did not, he warned, “the Frankenstein it has called into being will ultimately destroy 
government itself.”12 
 
Nye’s highly charged populist language, freely mixing classical and biblical allusions with 
references to Gothic horror, matched that of his North Dakota constituents, who 
throughout 1930 and 1931 deluged him with letters urging that action be taken to stop 
the chains. In February 1930, E. O. Moe, a banker from Galesburg, North Dakota, wrote 
Nye about “one of the most diabolical menaces that ever confronted the American 
people,” the “chain system.” “[C]hain stores, chain banks, chain this and chain that”, he 
wrote, had “infested our nation like a plague.” Echoing Nye’s attacks on privilege and 
monopoly, Moe warned that if “the people” did not “wake up to this menace…all 
individual enterprise and effort” would be “strangled.” Summoning rhetorical 
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inspiration from Frank Norris’ 1901 antimonopoly classic, The Octopus, he claimed that 
“these giant octopuses from the financial centers of the East” were “extending their 
slimy tentacles into most every state in the union.” For Moe, the rise of the chains 
represented “a reversion back to Feudalism”. The “chain system” was based on 
“eliminating the individual as a unit in industry,” he stated. “[T]he individual” would as a 
consequence be reduced to being no more than “a cog in a big machine.”13 
 
E. O. Moe’s conviction that the chains represented a threat to cherished values of self-
sufficiency and independence as well as to the solvency of individual economic units, 
was widely shared. Predictably, many, though by no means all, of the anti-chain store 
letters Nye received were from independent merchants. In April 1931, for example, 
thanking Nye for his opposition to “the chain store menace”, J. A. Miller of the Golden 
Rule Store in New Leipzig professed not to be a “socialist or communist, but a capitalist 
is allright” he told the senator, “only when his capital is owned by a great number of 
share holders.” H. F. Rodenberg, co-owner of a department store in New Rockford, 
complained that due to the chains it was now “very hard for a young man to go in[to] 
business for himself.” For F. R. Barnes of Marmarth the problem was brought about by 
“big money getting control of our national administration.” Another of Nye’s 
correspondents, Stephen C. Barnes, who owned a variety store in Williston, explained 
that “[the] feeling here in Williston among the independent merchants is that the 
spread of the chains and their unscrupulous methods…threatens the life and future of 
thousands in [sic] smaller merchants who have worked a life time to build up their 
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individual business.” “All the future holds [for them],” Barnes added, “is the chance of 
[becoming] an underpaid clerk, working in cog No 689 in store 1237, without hope of 
advancement, gain, possible partnership or ownership of a store of their own; – nothing 
but serfdom.”14 
 
Like some modern-day critics of globalization, Nye and his correspondents saw 
themselves as pitted somewhat apocalyptically against powerful, parasitic, and 
entrenched elites who were stripping them of their autonomy and threatening their 
values as well as their livelihoods. It has been argued, quite plausibly, that in many 
communities independent merchants were themselves virtual monopolists. Often they 
were the sole reliable source of credit in cash-starved local and regional economies. But 
these retailers did not see themselves that way. Instead, they employed, to borrow from 
Michael Kazin, “a language whose speakers conceive of ordinary people as a noble 
assemblage not bounded narrowly by class, view their elite opponents as self-serving 
and undemocratic, and seek to mobilize the former against the latter.” To this extent 
they stood squarely within the populist antimonopoly tradition.15 
 
The populist character of the anti-chain store movement may partly explain historians’ 
reluctance to subject it to serious scrutiny. Ellis Hawley described the movement as a 
crusade led by “popular demagogues” and “colorful rogues.” He was referring 
specifically to  Huey Long and W. K. Henderson, flamboyant Louisianans whose attacks 
on the chains were presented in an extravagant rhetorical style. “Where is the corner 
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groceryman?” Long once asked. “The Kingfish” believed that the concentration of 
economic power threatened the very existence of the independent middle class. 
Henderson, a Shreveport businessman, used his radio station, KWKH, the Hello World 
Broadcasting Corporation, vehemently to assail the chains. He rallied listeners across the 
South and Midwest to support local merchants and to boycott the chains. He used what 
some then deemed coarse language (“hell” and “damn”) to generate his own grassroots 
consumer movement. But Long and Henderson were not representative of either the 
movement as a whole or of its leadership. Other leading anti-chain figures, such as 
Joseph T. Robinson, Wright Patman, and Hugo Black – three of the more prominent anti-
chain congressmen – are less easily caricatured. As Hawley himself well understood, the 
anti-chain store movement amounted to much more than an emotional response to 
change whipped up by silver-tongued orators. It was a movement of some intellectual 
depth which posited, however crudely, an alternative conception of political economy.16 
 
“Such is the Frankenstein monster” 
 
The leading supporter of the anti-chain store movement in the judiciary, Supreme Court 
justice Louis D. Brandeis, could never be described as colorful, roguish, or demagogic. 
His opposition to the chains, particularly as it was articulated in his dissent in Louis K. 
Liggett Co. v. Lee, the Florida anti-chain store case that came before the supreme court 
in early 1933, suggests both the vitality of antimonopoly thought during the Great 
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Depression, and the fact that the anti-chain store movement had an impressive 
intellectual as well as emotional hinterland. 
 
That Brandeis was sympathetic to the anti-chain store movement is not in doubt. His 
dissent in Liggett was almost gleeful. On reading a draft of Brandeis’ opinion, which 
argued that the states were perfectly entitled to tax the chains, and that the privilege of 
incorporation was just that – a privilege – Harlan Stone, who with Benjamin Cardozo had 
so often joined Brandeis in making up the liberal minority on the court, told Brandeis 
that in this instance he was “too much an advocate of this kind of legislation.” Coming 
from Stone, that was quite a damning charge.17 
 
Whereas Stone deemed Brandeis’ dissent overenthusiastic, Owen D. Roberts, who 
wrote the majority opinion striking down the law, struggled to comprehend its 
relevance. “I appreciate your sending me the draft of your opinion in #301,” he wrote 
Brandeis, “[y]ou are quite right that I agree with much – indeed most – of what you 
say.” “The only difficulty I find,” he continued, “is in agreeing that these matters are 
involved in this particular case.” The “matters” Roberts referred to were those related 
to Brandeis’ lengthy disquisition on the history of the law of incorporation, which 
occupied the greater part of his opinion.18 
 
The majority opinion in Liggett stated that the Florida chain store tax was 
unconstitutional because it involved making an arbitrary distinction between chains in 
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one county and those in another. In 1931, the court had already ruled by the narrowest 
of margins in State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson that it was legitimate to tax 
chain and non-chain stores differently. Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone were joined in that 
ruling by Roberts and by the Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes. Jackson led to a flurry 
of anti-chain legislative activity. In 1933 alone, 225 anti-chain bills were introduced in 
forty-two states. For the most part, these bills, following the form affirmed in Jackson, 
were based on a system of graduated license fees. The Florida law, however, was 
slightly different in that it made a geographical distinction, and it was on this that the 
majority seized:19 
  
The addition of a store to an existing chain is a privilege, and an increase of the tax on all 
the stores for the privilege of expanding the chain cannot be condemned as arbitrary; 
but an increase in the levy, not only on a new store, but on all the old stores, 
consequent upon the mere physical fact that the new one lies a few feet over a county 
line, finds no foundation in reason or in any fact of business experience.20 
 
Of the three justices who dissented, two – Cardozo and Stone – contented themselves 
with contesting the majority’s argument that the geographical distinction made in the 
Florida law was arbitrary. In a largely agricultural state with a widely dispersed 
population such as Florida, Cardozo argued, it was a reasonable exercise of discretion 
for the legislature to use county lines to distinguish between the local and nonlocal. If a 
chain determined to take on the “hazard of new adventures” by opening a branch in 
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another county then it had, Cardozo averred, “put its local character away, and found 
alignment in another class.”21 
 
In his separate dissent, Brandeis went much further. Reflecting his belief that “social and 
economic life” should inform judicial decision-making, he took pains to emphasise the 
destructive motive of the Florida law, and the fact that it arose out of social and moral 
concerns. Brandeis and his clerks began working on the Liggett dissent on January 23, 
1933, in the midst of the “interregnum of despair”, the period between Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s election in November and his taking office in the following March. By 
January 28 they had arrived at a 5th draft which included a statement in the opening 
paragraph that “the raising of revenue is obviously not the sole purpose of the 
legislation.” Brandeis knew, however, that what was obvious to him was not obvious to 
the majority. The court would rule that to say the Florida law was aimed at “giant 
corporations” was “to attribute…a covert, hidden, and indirect purpose to those who 
passed the statute.” The fact that all the plaintiffs were large corporations did not 
impress Roberts, who suggested that to assume this motive would be “to construe the 
act by pure speculation.” Anticipating this line of reasoning, by the time Brandeis arrived 
at a final draft he had strengthened his opening, changing “sole” to “main”. Now the 
raising of revenue was a secondary motive. The “main purpose” was “to protect the 
individual, independently-owned retail stores from the competition of chain stores.”22 
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Brandeis dismissed with almost peremptory brevity the grounds on which the Florida 
anti-chain store law was struck down: 
 
There is nothing in the record to show affirmatively that the provision may not be a 
reasonable one in view of conditions prevailing in Florida. Since the presumption of 
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for 
overthrowing the statute, its validity should, in my opinion, be sustained.23 
 
Then, feigning disinterest in the question of whether anti-chain taxation was desirable 
(“Whether the citizens of Florida are wise in seeking to discourage the operation of 
chain stores is, obviously, a matter with which the Court has no concern”), he launched 
into an immensely detailed, voluminously researched, and typically didactic discussion 
of the history of incorporation. “Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or 
withheld”, he insisted, “is always a matter of state policy.” In a less than veiled attack on 
his conservative peers, he chastised those “men of this generation” who believed that 
“the privilege of doing business in corporate form were inherent in the citizen”, noting 
that fear of concentrated power, and the perception that “large aggregations of capital” 
represented an “insidious menace” to individual liberty and equality of opportunity, 
were deeply embedded in the nation’s history.24 
 
The footnotes to Brandeis’ opinion, to say nothing of the vast reading lists with which he 
was supplied by the Library of Congress’ librarians, show that the justice had read 
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widely on the international history of corporation law, the economics of the chain store, 
and the cooperative movement. He leant especially heavily however on Adolph Berle 
and Gardiner Means’ recently published The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 
which claimed that 200 corporations controlled almost a quarter of the nation’s wealth, 
and that the separation of ownership from control meant that corporations were in 
some instances able to dominate the state. As in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, the 
1932 case in which he had suggested that the nation’s economic collapse had been 
brought about by the “failure to distribute widely the profits of industry”, in Liggett 
Brandeis linked the “negation of industrial democracy”, and the inequalities of wealth it 
promoted, to the deepening economic malaise, claiming that “the resulting disparity in 
incomes is a major cause of the existing depression.” Seeking an image to capture the 
magnitude of the threat, he expressed himself in terms strikingly similar to those 
employed by the North Dakota merchants who had written so despairingly to Senator 
Nye: “Such is the Frankenstein monster which states have created by their corporation 
laws.”25 
 
Here, Brandeis was striving to combine his conviction that the law should respond to life 
and history while making full use of the latest social scientific research, with his aversion 
to bigness. In attempting to move, to use Phillipa Strum’s phrase, “beyond 
progressivism”, Brandeis of Boston, with his mugwumpish faith in expertise and 
scientific approach to the law, adopted an attention-grabbing populist rhetorical style. 
Brandeis, of course, was not a populist in any conventional sense. Even his admirers 
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thought him not a man of the people but rather, as his friend Harold Laski observed, a 
sort of “prophet”. What is significant here however is that by employing the 
Frankenstein metaphor “the people’s attorney” used an image that shows continuity 
between the language and beliefs of grassroots protesters and the mode of Brandeisian 
progressivism which influenced the early New Deal. In the darkest days of the 
Depression, antimonopoly thought, and the vision of a nation based on the initiative of 
“small men” operating within an economy of small units, was a still vital force on the 
Supreme Court as well in the small towns across the nation from which the anti-chain 
movement drew much of its strength.26 
 
It may be an exaggeration to propose, as has Richard Schragger, that “Brandeisian 
localism” represented “a lost alternative to the liberalism of the late New Deal”; but 
Brandeis’ defence of the anti-chain cause reminds us of the richness and variety of the 
reformist agendas that were circulating in the 1930s. In the early 1930s especially, the 
future of political economy (and therefore of the politics of consumption) in the United 
States was up for grabs. The precise fate of these various agendas, and the strains of 
political thought to which they were tied – antimonopolism, centralized planning, and 
corporatism, amongst others – was by no means foreordained.27 
 
In this context it is important to emphasise that the politics of consumption that 
emerged from the New Deal were markedly different from those that made it. As Alan 
Brinkley has explained, the liberalism that evolved in the late 1930s and which was 
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consolidated during the Second World War “wrapped itself in the mantle of the New 
Deal, but bore only a partial resemblance to the ideas that had shaped the original New 
Deal.” Historians of the New Deal era have acknowledged Brandeis’s role – and that of 
his disciples – in shaping the Roosevelt administration’s approach to political economy 
in the 1930s; historians of the politics of consumption, however, have yet to be 
persuaded that antimonopolism, whether in its populist or Brandeisian form, is 
pertinent to them, except in representing what the modern politics of consumption 
replaced. As Richard Schragger has observed, it is typically assumed that the story of the 
twentieth-century politics of consumption is that of the relationship between the 
emerging consumer and the liberal state, an approach which is necessarily dismissive of 
alternative perspectives, whether reformist or reactionary.28 
 
The end of anti-chain store politics? 
 
By the mid-1930s, the anti-chain store movement had run its course as a popular 
movement. Grassroots activity crested in the early 1930s, in the years when the 
Depression was at its deepest and before the chains had adapted their message to 
counter the claims of their opponents. But the movement’s advocates in Congress 
persisted in pressing for some legislative means of protecting merchants. Leading the 
legislative charge was Wright Patman of Texarkana, whose congressional district was 
one of the poorest in the nation. Patman’s political outlook – like that of other southern 
populists sympathetic to the anti-chain campaign – was based on the notion that the 
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economy should be organised so as to preserve the autonomy of local producers and 
the communities they served. He espoused many of the causes that would later be 
associated with consumer advocacy – most notably banking reform and more aggressive 
regulation of corporations – but his approach was chiefly producer- rather than 
consumer-oriented.  
 
Like the nineteenth-century Populists, Patman resented what he regarded as the 
monopolistic power of Northern banks and corporations and perceived the South and 
West as unjustly subjugated colonies. “[T]he North is the American money mart that is 
fed by the monetary streams of trade and commerce originating in the South and 
West,” he said. His solutions to this problem were of similar vintage: he advocated 
increasing the amount of money in circulation and erecting barriers to prevent big 
corporations from distorting local competition.29 
 
Patman, whose congressional career bridged the pre- and post-New Deal eras, 
embodied the problematic position of the antimonopoly tradition as it related to the 
wider politics of reform in the United States. Like other southern populists, he idealized 
community-based economic activity but at the same time assumed that the 
preservation of the local order – Jim Crow notwithstanding – was benign, even when 
that order perpetuated racial and gender hierarchies that worked systematically to 
disadvantage racial minorities and women. He opposed the Ku Klux Klan but he also 
opposed federal anti-lynching legislation and the employment during the Second World 
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War of African Americans in war-related industries. After the Second World War, he 
criticized Eisenhower’s use of federal troops at Little Rock in 1957 and voted against the 
civil rights bills of the 1950s and 1960s. In the course of his long career he showed no 
appreciation of the gendered nature of his vision of a nation of small towns led by 
independent businessmen.30 
 
Other antimonopolists in Congress were more conservative still. Senate Majority Leader 
Joseph T. Robinson, who co-sponsored the Robinson-Patman Act, viewed his efforts to 
shield independent merchants from low-cost competition as a natural extension of 
Wilsonian progressivism; but the Arkansas senator could not bring himself to support 
federal minimum-wage legislation, and was a fierce opponent of the Southern Tenant 
Farmers’ Union’s attempts to unionize southern agriculture. Some later 
antimonopolists, such as Tennessee senator Estes Kefauver were a good deal more 
liberal on racial issues; but it is true nonetheless that the localist philosophy at the core 
of the antimonopoly tradition entrenched sometimes pernicious local hierarchies and 
power relations. Since the New Deal, and the consolidation of the idea that liberalism 
requires an active federal government in order to address economic, racial and other 
inequalities, localists have struggled to find a home for themselves within the 
mainstream politics of reform.31 
 
Antimonopolists in Congress did not easily give up their assault on the chains. In 
February 1938, Wright Patman submitted a bill for a national chain store tax. It 
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proposed a graduated scale by which chains would be taxed from $50 to $1000 per 
store depending upon their number and location. Because this figure would then be 
multiplied by the number of states in which a chain had stores, there was a chance that 
the tax might in some cases exceed annual profits. If this scale had been applied in 1938, 
for example, the biggest chain store company, the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea 
Company (A&P), would have been taxed $524 million on its $882 million in sales. 
Tellingly, whereas its supporters called his measure the “community preservation bill” 
its opponents in the business press and among chain store organizations referred to it as 
the “death-sentence bill.”32 
  
Leading figures in the anti-chain drive worked together as part of an informal network. 
Louis D. Brandeis and Wright Patman met, for instance, for an hour in March 1937 to 
discuss how to combat monopoly. In 1940 they cooperated again on the hearings for 
the Patman’s chain store tax. Despite this joint effort, Patman’s plans for a federal chain 
store tax never materialised. By 1940 the chains had had time to respond to the anti-
chain onslaught. They had persuaded farmers that the chains’ distribution networks 
served their interests, and they had convinced organized labor that they were good 
employers. Some consumer groups, too, viewed the chains as welcome components of 
a progressive, low-price economy, while real estate agents saw in the chains the chance 
to profit from local development. In the absence of effective interest group 
representation, and lacking the broad base of popular support that had characterised 
the anti-chain store movement of the late 1920s and early 1930s, the federal chain store 
 24   
 
tax died in committee. The death of the “death sentence” bill effectively brought the 
Depression-era phase of American anti-chain politics to a close.33 
 
From producer to consumer advocacy 
 
Having surveyed the character and historical trajectory of the anti-chain store 
movement, we can now consider the relationship between the antimonopolism that 
informed the anti-chain store politics of the 1920s and 1930s, and the post-war politics 
of consumption. What is the relationship between what we might call the “producer 
advocacy” of Wright Patman and his populist allies and the “consumer advocacy” that 
became part of the mainstream of American politics in the 1960s and 1970s? 
 
In the 1920s, when the anti-chain store movement began, the most visible form of 
consumer activism was that pursued by middle-class women reformers in such 
organizations as the National Consumers’ League. With some justification, many 
historians regard such women as the founders of modern consumer politics. But this 
essay argues that antimonopoly politics – championed for the most part by male 
populists rather than female progressives – represents both a second component of the 
ideological origins of post-war consumer politics, and a persistent strain within those 
politics through the latter half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.  
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Consider, for instance, that in the 1940s and 1950s, the United States’ most active and 
visible champion of consumer issues in Congress, Estes Kefauver, was also its most 
prominent antimonopolist. Kefauver devoted the greater part of his career to a series of 
populist attacks on monopolistic practices, whether in the form of railroad mergers, the 
basing point system, or administered prices. Kefauver was the lead figure among a 
cluster of congressmen – Paul Douglas, Philip Hart, William Proxmire, Edmund Muskie, 
Warren Magnussen – who, from the 1940s to the 1970s, drew to varying degrees on the 
antimonopoly tradition to champion the cause of the consumer. It was Douglas, 
Kefauver, and Hart, for example, who fought hardest in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
in an effort to persuade the federal government to establish a new Department of 
Consumers so that – as Kefuaver himself put it – “the voice of the consumer” would be 
“heard in the land”.34 
 
Antimonopolism’s contribution to post-war consumer politics continued through the 
1960s and 1970s. An illustration of this link is the political bond formed, in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, between Wright Patman – the politician most closely associated 
with the older anti-chain store movement – and Ralph Nader, indisputably the leading 
consumer advocate of the post-war era. Patman and Nader were both crusaders, 
politicians driven by a powerful sense of injustice who directed their political attention 
toward what they perceived to be undemocratic concentrations of economic power. 
Indeed, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, these “strange bedfellows”, as the 
Washington Post called them, campaigned together, attacking one-bank holding 
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companies for evading the terms of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act and criticising 
Delaware’s incorporation laws.35 
 
Nader believed that Patman was a prophetic figure who had anticipated and fought the 
consumer movement’s battles even before they were understood in those terms. 
“Whether the issue deals with consumer credit, credit unions, bank mergers, the secret 
power of the Federal Reserve, the bank holding company movement or adequate credit 
for housing,” he wrote in January 1975, “Patman remains the youngest populist of them 
all.”36  
 
On Patman’s death the following year, Nader made explicit the links between a populist 
antimonopolism typically associated with the pre-New Deal era and post-war consumer 
politics. “For half a century,” he wrote, “Wright Patman was a great public educator on 
the power of big money and banking. He was an unyielding and genial populist whose 
ideals and ardor never eroded. The great Texas legislator was right too soon, too often, 
about the giant banks and the Federal Reserve. But he lived to witness the news of the 
day -- further confirming his findings of long ago.” In another tribute, Texan 
congressman Jim Wright, elaborated upon the same theme: “Long before today’s self-
proclaimed consumer advocates were born, Wright Patman was in Congress waging a 
lonely, but effective fight against those who would exploit their fellow citizens of 
modest means."37 
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The fact that Nader saw himself – and the broader movement of which he was a part – 
as standing in Patman’s shadow poses fascinating questions for historians interested in 
the origins and trajectory of twentieth century consumer politics. It hints at the flawed 
nature of the producer-consumer dichotomy customarily adopted by historians, and it 
suggests that populist antimonopolism had a hitherto unrecognised formative impact on 
modern consumer activism. 
 
The idea that there was in the twentieth century a shift from a producer- to a consumer-
oriented economy, society and culture provides a powerful explanatory structure for 
understanding the changing contours of recent American history. But if this framework 
is adopted uncritically, with insufficient attention to the ways in which the worlds of 
consumers are connected to the worlds of producers, distributors, and retailers, it is 
likely to prove inadequate. If historians assume, for instance, that a consumer’s world 
replaced a producer’s world entirely, then important continuities and connections 
between those worlds, as well as significant counter-currents of resistance to change, 
might be unduly obscured. There is much scope for more historical work both on the 
connections between pre-New Deal producerism and post-New Deal consumerism, and 
on the persistence of producerism into the post-war era. 
 
A further problem with the notion of a transition from producerism to consumerism 
within the United States is that the politics of consumption do not observe national 
borders; they are international and transnational, as well as local, regional, and national. 
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While there is comparative work on the politics of consumption, it focuses 
overwhelmingly on the United States and Europe. There is therefore tremendous 
potential for transnational study. It is quite obvious today that, for example, the United 
States’ politics of consumption are also China’s politics of production. The exploitative 
quasi-colonial relationship between the American South and West and the 
concentration of financial and governmental power in the Northeast that informed 
Wright Patman’s perception of politics in the 1920s and 1930s may now, arguably, be 
detected on a global scale as American consumers demand goods and raw materials 
from the emerging economies of the global South. Historians might also undertake 
comparative studies of early- and mid-twentieth century small producer populisms. How 
for instance does Wright Patman’s politics compare to that of Pierre Poujade and his 
followers in post-war France? 
 
A second challenge presented by the Patman-Nader connection is that, as Lawrence 
Glickman has noted, the history of consumer activism in the United States has been 
dominated by work which assumes that modern consumer politics developed through 
discontinuous eruptions of reform in (with some minor variations) the 1900s, 1930s, and 
1960s. Lizabeth Cohen, for example, has proposed that the consumer movement 
developed in three “waves”, each of which reconfigured the relationship between the 
consumer and the state. These “waves” broadly coincide with the bouts of liberal 
reform conventionally associated with the Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society 
eras. First, at the dawn of the twentieth century, progressive reformers placed the 
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consumer at the forefront of their conception of citizenship whilst at the grassroots 
housewives and laborers campaigned for a higher standard of living. Then, in the 1930s, 
New Deal policymakers and economists combined with citizen activists – women and 
African Americans prominent among them – to form a “second wave”, placing the 
“citizen consumer” centerstage. In the 1960s and 1970s, as the raised expectations of 
the immediate post-war era yielded to the constraints imposed by economic crisis of the 
1970s, a “third wave consumer movement”, better attuned to the more segmented and 
socially differentiated environment of the post-war world emerged.38 
 
Such taxonomies provide a plausible framework for understanding the broad historical 
contours of America’s politics of consumption. Cohen’s work is particularly important 
because it shows how activity at the grassroots – with women and African Americans 
once more at the vanguard – combined with state-level policymaking to shape the 
“consumers’ republic.” She also provides a necessary corrective to the view that the 
search for the origins of consumer culture must begin with urban elites, 
professionalization, and expertise. But Cohen’s view of the origins and trajectory of 
twentieth-century consumer politics is incomplete. Sometimes, as with the anti-chain 
store movement in the 1920s and 1930s, grassroots activists promoted a cause that 
ultimately was not supported by most liberal policymakers, and which in fact came to 
stand in opposition to the liberal state as it had developed by the mid-twentieth 
century, but which nevertheless was connected both at the level of ideas and political 
leadership to the post-war consumer movement.39  
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Anti-chain store movements: old and new 
 
The ideological origins of contemporary consumer politics, then, were more 
heterogenous than has previously been recognised; they can be traced back not only to 
late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century progressives and their New Deal heirs, but 
also to political and intellectual forces extraneous, or only ambivalently related, to the 
rise and fall of the New Deal order. The populist antimonoplism that informed the anti-
chain store movement, and which in varying degrees animated Louis Brandeis’ and 
Wright Patman’s views of political economy, represented one of the ideological streams 
that flowed into the post-war consumer movement. Suspicion of bigness, and the 
related belief that unchecked corporate power represented a threat to democracy, 
continued to exert an influence on American politics well beyond the New Deal. 
 
That is not to say, however, that the Depression-era anti-chain store movement was the 
same as its modern-day counterpart. In fact the differences between them are both 
important and instructive. In the 1920s and 1930s it was clear that small retailers 
themselves led the movement. While they succeeded in attracting considerable support 
from other quarters, it was the merchants who always formed the core of the 
movement. Organized labor, for instance, did take an interest in the anti-chain furore 
but its interventions were selective, based not on aversion to large-scale organizations 
but on a desire to improve the wages and conditions of unionized workers. Accordingly, 
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once the American Federation of Labor unions had agreed collective-bargaining terms 
with A&P in 1938 and 1939, the unions – conscious that their members were consumers 
as much as they were producers – backed the low-price chains against their small-town 
foes. Labor’s response to the chains during the late New Deal shows how intimately 
were the politics of consumption and production entwined.40  
 
The balance of power between organized labor and independent shopkeepers is quite 
different today. While it is true that small retailers, joined by an assortment community 
activists, have been a persistent thorn in the side of big-box retailers at the local level 
over the last twenty years or so, it is the unions, led by the United Food and Commercial 
Workers, that have since the turn of the twenty-first century been the most forceful and 
effective opponents of the big chains. The hostility of the current legal and political 
regime toward organized labor, combined with WalMart’s transformative role in the 
world economy, make the stakes of the unions’ present struggles just as high as they 
were for country merchants who feared for the livelihoods during the Great Depression. 
They also lend it a global dimension that was not a feature of the older anti-chain store 
movement.41 
 
Today’s independent merchants have very limited political leverage. They no longer 
have access to the symbolic or rhetorical resources on which their Depression-era 
predecessors could call. This is the case even when they are aided by engaged local 
residents, whether they be eager to preserve the character of their neighbourhoods, to 
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consume ethically, to keep traffic and other forms of pollution off their streets, or to 
protect the prices of their homes. If they are to make progress in their present 
campaigns, small-town retailers need to find more effective ways of converting 
consumers’ unease about the size and power of corporate giants such as WalMart into a 
decisive form of political action. 
  
Despite these differences between the two movements, twenty-first-century anti-chain 
activists are in the process of rediscovering the anti-chain protesters of the 1920s and 
1930s. Al Norman, the author of two anti-Wal-Mart tracts and founder of 
Sprawlbusters, a website that tracks anti-chain activity, has used his website to tell his 
followers about their Depression-era forebears. John Dicker has argued that the Great 
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P) was to the anti-chain forces in the first half of 
the twentieth century what Wal-Mart is to campaigners in the twenty-first. Most 
arrestingly, perhaps, Stacy Mitchell of the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, has suggested 
that state-level anti-chain store taxes of the sort championed by Brandeis and Patman 
be revived as an instrument of public policy. These campaigners realise that their 
arguments – that corporate retail is inimical to community life, that it is ugly, and that it 
exploits workers while driving small businesses into the ground – are not new. On the 
surface at least, they are strikingly similar to those put by Kansas City businessman 
Charles H. Lyon, in the letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt with which this study opened.42 
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Historians seeking a usable past have, in contrast, been harsh in their assessment of 
anti-chain protesters past and present, portraying their critiques of the chains as 
insubstantial and self-serving. Meg Jacobs, for example, believes that anti-Wal-Mart 
protesters are “self-interested,” motivated primarily by “aesthetic disdain” and by what 
is implied to be a spurious “claim” that corporate retailers wreck a “sense” of 
community. Lizabeth Cohen praises Christopher Lasch and Michael Sandel for their 
contributions to debates about America’s politics of consumption but describes as 
unrealistic their calls for a renewed emphasis on civic as opposed to consumer values. 
“[S]uch an alternative hopelessly resides,” she writes, “in an unregainable past.”43 
 
She may well be right. But nostalgia for a golden age can seduce scholars from across 
the entire political spectrum. Jacobs and Cohen, for example, both conclude their hard-
headed accounts of the relationships between citizenship, consumerism and the state in 
the twentieth century with elegiac calls for a return to values rooted in the past. Both 
recommend that the politics of consumption the New Deal made be revived. Jacobs 
insists that the model of economic citizenship that emerged from the New Deal 
represents the best hope for reconstructing the “democratic potential of an engaged 
citizenry pursuing the promise of a better, richer life.” Cohen proposes “encourag[ing] 
the revival of the citizen consumer ideal that prevailed during Great Depression and 
World War II, with its commitment to building into the agencies of government a power 
base for consumers to assert their will.” How this could be done in the present political 
climate is not made clear. It is debatable whether Jacobs’ and Cohen’s New Deal 
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revivalism is any less romantic than the idealised civic republicanism of Lasch and 
Sandel.44 
 
Given the nature of these debates there is a danger that the historiography of 
consumption, in the United States at least, might deteriorate into an exercise in 
competitive nostalgia, with various factions accusing the other of idealizing the past. 
What emerges from this study of the history and historiography of the anti-chain store 
movement, however, is that the boundaries between New Deal liberalism and civic 
republicanism are distinctly blurred. The populist antimonopolism which informed anti-
chain politics and helped shape post-war consumer politics was not alien to the New 
Deal. Antimonopolists such as Brandeis and Patman helped make the New Deal (even if 
they did not appreciate the form it eventually took), just as Nader helped fashion the 
liberal re-adjustment of the 1960s and 1970s. What this suggests is that any usable 
legacy for a more progressive politics of consumption needs to take account of the 
heterogeneity of the United States’ politics of reform, and therefore of the important 
place within those of politics of an antimonopoly tradition that cherished small-scale 
economies and localism. This in turn reminds us that it was the energy created by 
competing, and often fiercely conflicting, reformist agendas that made the New Deal 
such a dynamic and enduring force in American history. It also suggests that our efforts 
to grapple effectively with the politics of consumption in the twentieth, and twenty-
first, centuries have only just begun. 
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